INTERNAL MARKET SYSTEMS AS MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL ARTICULATION

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MARKETS are mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of goods and services. As such, the presence of markets defines nonself-sufficiency. Market places are the loci where concrete exchanges take place. They facilitate the sale and acquisition of goods and services not as easily obtainable, or not obtainable at all, within a smaller social circle or unit. When a society possesses an organized framework for the conduct of economic exchanges --customary centers of exchange with their aggregates of buyers and sellers, a calendar of market days, and other features giving exchanges regularity and a predictable form--it possesses an internal marketing system.

By "articulation" is meant here simply "relationship." Different segments of a single society--classes, castes, occupational groups, and the like--are related or interactive through institutional means, one of which is the set of economic practices that ensure and maintain production and distribution. The market mechanism, as part of the economic structure, operates in this way among others. Where the market system is subject to custom, ritual, hereditary assignment of position, fixed price regulation, and like considerations, it may play an important part in articulating different social and economic groups, but that part will be circumscribed by the norms prescribing behavior for group members. Such are the situations which Polanyi is describing when he writes of societies in which the economic system is embedded in the social, political, and religious framework, and the free movement of labor, land, capital, and commodities is sharply restricted. In these situations the market system cannot change quickly, or serve different forms of articulation, until it begins to be shaken loose from its traditional social context. Internal exchange systems with markets, but carefully checked by law and custom, include the fairs of medieval Europe and the great markets of West Africa of several centuries ago. Royal monopolies, regulated prices, heavily ritualized exchanges, separate internal and foreign trade circles, and different markets for royalty and commoners are some of the diagnostic characteristics of "unfree" market systems. Freeing a market system from traditional and ritual bonds may hold the potentiality of conflict between social groups. But, in any case, any new articulations an internal market system may serve cannot emerge until the market is at least partly free from traditional social, religious, and other restrictions.

"Peasant society," as used here, refers to a wide variety of social systems, all of which possess substantial numbers of small-scale landholders who produce crops for sale as well as for consumption, and who are subject to some degree of outside control. These peasantries, in Wolf's view, aim at a culturally standardized level of life, rather than at continuously expanded production. As Redfield made clear, peasantries are sub-
ject to controls wielded by the state, and their position within their respective whole societies is defined by outside forces, symbolized by the city.\textsuperscript{5} Though these terms of reference will surely be refined and revised in the future, they probably hold for such societies as Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, and Mexico, whose internal market systems will serve as illustrations here. In two of these societies, the internal market systems were pre-Columbian in origin, and their early character has not been satisfactorily established. In the other two societies, the internal market systems were created as adjuncts to the institutions of slavery and the plantation and continued to function as internal economic mechanisms after the end of slavery in Jamaica, and after the end of slavery and the plantation in Haiti. In all four cases, the internal market systems today are typified generally by the relatively free movement of goods, services, buyers and sellers, and prices. An attempt will be made here to show that the articulation provided by these systems is subject to some changes originating in the distributive process itself, to the extent that economic activity is indeed free. At the same time, it will be clear that the kind and amount of change that can occur are limited by economic forces outside the internal market system and by the power of the state. Since detailed comparisons of internal market systems must await the gathering of data of special kinds, more time must be spent here in raising questions about the "anatomy" of these systems than in process analysis of such systems as mechanisms of articulation.

To begin with, in societies marked by economic and social differentiation, the exchange of goods and services through the market system may occur as between class equals who fill different productive roles, or as between classes, which vary not only in their productive roles, but also in their group access to wealth and capital, social status, and political power. Where the exchange of goods and services ends in their consumption by class equals, it may be called "horizontal exchange." Where the exchange of goods and services ends in their consumption by members of a class different from that of their producers, it may be called "vertical exchange." A related and derived distinction will have to be made as to the class position of the intermediaries who participate in such exchanges. The distributive process may involve the movement of goods through the hands of intermediaries who differ in their class position from the producers, from the consumers, or both. Finally, a distinction must be made between "upward" and "downward" vertical exchange. Imports and trade goods, for instance, which pass from the importer, wholesaler, or factory owner to the peasantry illustrate downward vertical exchange; fresh vegetables and craft goods which pass from the peasantry to the middle classes and bureaucracy illustrate upward vertical exchange.

Either horizontal or vertical exchange can occur without a fixed medium of exchange or standard of value. But exchange is more often expedited by the use of some standard unit, and, in most contemporary internal market systems, these units take the form of a national currency. Exchange in market places through the use of money is typical of all peasant marketing systems in the New World today\textsuperscript{6}--as in the case of Mexico, Guatemala, Jamaica, or Haiti--and probably of the vast majority of marketing systems in peasant societies the world over. Exceptions in contemporary New World systems, as in parts of Guatemala and the Andean highlands, are of interest today mainly because they are uncommon and because they appear to be steadily diminishing.

It is not possible to estimate precisely what percentage by value of the produce which passes through the internal markets of countries such as Haiti and Jamaica is consumed by members of the same class as the producers. The figure surely exceeds one-half in each instance. In many cases, the peasantry of a region must sell off part of what it
needs immediately. Subsequently the same individuals may buy back the same items they sold earlier, usually at a higher price. The market in these instances is serving a combined storage-and-credit function. The market's usefulness in this connection is related to the peasant's limited means of storage, his chronic shortage of liquid capital, and perhaps to his culturally standardized preference for buying needed goods often and in small quantities. But of course these are not the only reasons for horizontal exchange. Such exchange is supported by regional variation in the supply of handicraft materials and the attached variation in craft tradition; by variation in altitude, climate, soil type, and growing season; and by the presence of consumption standards which preclude local self-sufficiency and may come to undermine it increasingly.

Upward vertical exchange in the market places of the four societies named earlier serves principally to supply nonagricultural producers of a higher class position with a few specialized products. Most important here are agricultural items, especially perishable foods, which the peasantry supplies for the cuisines of the town dwellers, middle classes, and tourists of these nations. Less important are the utilitarian objects such as brooms, baskets, mats, and minor tinware, ceramic, or leather articles. More often these items are "folk art," including the woven cloth and clothing of Guatemala and Mexico, the drums and mahogany craft of Haiti, and the basketry and jippi-jappa products of Jamaica. An important aspect of upward vertical exchange is the extent to which the products it comprises are consumed exclusively by a class different from that of the producers. Even with regard to foodstuffs, there are few indeed which are consumed in common by both peasantry and other classes.

But vertical exchange proceeds downwardly as well as upwardly. The consumption norms of the peasantry include not only regionally and seasonally differentiated products, but also some particular essentials manufactured only in urban centers or abroad. The extent to which this downward movement takes place through the internal marketing system varies. To some degree at least the channels of movement are determined by national legislation and its enforcement, as well as by established custom. In Haiti, there are very few items a peasant must buy in a store. Cloth, clothing, agricultural tools, needles and thread, cooking oil, fuel, cooking utensils, foreign spices, bread made with imported flour, even common medicinals and nearly everything else that the peasant needs which originates in the city or abroad can be purchased in the market place. In the case of Jamaica, however, all of these items are usually obtainable only in stores. Arbitrary or customary limitation of the market place to the sale of particular products restricts the entry of new intermediaries and inhibits the growth of the market place itself as a locus of economic activity. Insistence that certain products be sold only in stores, and/or with particular licenses, further limits the growth of new groups of intermediaries. Hence any such limitations are relevant to an examination of the internal market as a mechanism of social articulation.

At the same time that the internal market system must be viewed in terms of the kinds of exchange which can take place within it, those trade channels which circumvent or fail to make use of the internal market places must also be noted. Such are the special media designed to bulk, process, grade, and move the major world market crops produced by the peasantry. In the case of Guatemalan coffee and bananas, Jamaican sugar, and Haitian sisal to a large degree, the peasant participates only to the extent of selling his labor. But in the case of Haitian coffee and cotton, Jamaican pimento, and Jamaican bananas to a considerable degree, the peasant produces world market crops on his own land, yet they are marketed through specially designed means and special intermediaries. Of
course small quantities of cotton and coffee and sisal will be found in Haitian market places, and ripe bananas in Jamaican market places. But it is expressly because these products do not qualify for export and are being marketed for horizontal exchange and local consumption that they are found in the market places at all. Thus at least one very important category of rural intermediary functions outside the internal marketing system in these countries. Where downward vertical exchange of certain products is expressly forbidden in the markets, there are two such categories of exchange and their accompanying intermediaries, with different social positions and functions, outside the internal marketing system.

The professional intermediaries who carry on their activities in the market places function in several ways which differ in economic meaning: they may bulk produce, transport it, store it, process it, and break bulk for retailing. In Haiti, the middlemen carry on all of these activities and may also serve as credit sources or bankers. And it is of more than passing interest that, in two of the four societies mentioned at least, almost all intermediaries are women. One of the possible implications of this division of labor may be examined here. In Jamaica and Haiti, and possibly in Guatemala and Mexico as well, there appears to be some discontinuity, or lack of fit, between the productive and distributive sectors of the peasant economy. The arguments which favor the concept of the "dual economy" seem to lose much of their force when applied to these countries.

But the difference suggested here between production and distribution may have some utility. In the societies mentioned, it is the productive sector of the peasant economy which seems to exhibit more conservatism, nonexpansiveness, traditional technique, and less firmly rooted market orientation. In contrast, the distributive sector, as represented in large part by the internal market system, appears to be more open to change, more expansive, and more resilient. This is doubtless due in part to the fact that distributive intermediaries have more maneuverability in their dealings than peasant producers. But, further, the nature of internal marketing activity exposes the distributors to more potential innovations, and educates them in economic resourcefulness, in a way that peasant production cannot. Since the marketers in Jamaica and Haiti are almost exclusively women, the implications of the differences between production and distribution among the peasantry have a special sociological, as well as economic, meaning. Wolf has suggested that the delegation of the middleman role to the woman in these societies involves her in an entirely different risk structure, as he puts it, demanding a different economic orientation. In this connection, it is important that the woman's commercial activities do not permit her to commit heavily the economic effort or resources of her peasant producer husband; she acquires her stock normally from a great many individual sellers. The only commitment she might exact from her husband is some part of the original capital she needs to initiate her business. Though her marketing activity reduces the labor contribution she is able to make to the cultivation of her and her husband's land, it is of interest that this is of limited importance in the peasant production patterns of Jamaica and Haiti.

The preceding presentation enumerates certain general characteristics relating to the economies of peasant societies, with special reference to their systems of internal exchange. Though they surely do not hold for all cases, they are probably valid for Haiti, Jamaica, Guatemala, and perhaps Mexico. The characteristics are:

1. Internal market systems, as defined earlier.
2. The use of a national currency in most internal marketing transactions.
3. A horizontal flow of goods among class equals through the internal marketing systems, probably accounting for well over half of all internal marketing activity.

4. A vertical and downward flow of manufactured goods and imports, only partly through these systems.

5. A vertical and upward flow of staples, perishables, and craft items, mainly through these systems.

6. An outward flow of staples for the world market, moving only through special channels.

7. Numerous intermediaries within the marketing system, who facilitate economic activity in the market places by performing bulking, storing, transport, processing, and bulk-breaking services, and serving as credit sources as well. In two of the cases mentioned, almost all intermediaries are women.

8. An economic division or discontinuity in that peasant production may be more conservative and traditional, and less fully capitalistic, while peasant marketing inclines to be open to change, and more capitalistic in ideology and practice.

To these eight characteristics must now be added a ninth, which is of some significance here but which defies easy treatment. There is little if any evidence of deliberate price control on the part of sellers in the internal markets of the societies named earlier. Nor is there any evidence of price-fixing from above, that is, by government fiat, for those products which are sold in the internal markets. To the extent that such statements hold true, the prices of produce flowing through the internal markets of these countries are a continuous expression of the relation of supply and demand. There are exceptions, but on the local level, at least, the absence of externally imposed standards of price, or of monopolies or price-fixing combinations, is revealing. In economic terms, these markets are typified by competition which is nearly perfect, as Foster has suggested for Mexico, the writer for Jamaica, and Métraux and his coworkers have implied for Haiti.

It does not follow, however, that there are no examples of so-called "noneconomic" forces at work within them. If the tendency of earlier observers of these systems was to overemphasize such noneconomic forces, surely the pendulum has now swung the other way. What seems true is that there is an important personal element in the conduct of internal marketing activity in these societies. The nature of this economic personalism may be elucidated as follows. Produce which reaches the internal markets is not usually bulked in great quantities but moves instead in small lots. Only a small (though economically important) number of intermediaries bulk and transport large quantities of a few items for the internal market. The movement of human beings, by weight, may exceed the movement of produce itself in these systems. Purchases are small, and each load of goods is customarily accompanied by a selling intermediary. Most middlemen carry stocks which are diversified as well as small in quantity, so that the distributive pattern in this regard seems to parallel the peasant productive pattern. Exchange is frequent, and the same sellers generally follow a yearly round of activity, returning to the same places with the same stock, season by season, and buying from the same sources. These circumstances apparently lead to the creation of large numbers of personal relationships between sellers and sellers, and buyers and sellers. Behind the operation of supply and demand, then, there is a network of person-to-person dealings which persist over time and outlast any single transaction. And along with the near-perfect competition which determines price in relation to supply and demand, there is slight but significant variation in the quantities given particular buyers, extension of credit, and the dispensing of
other services, which tie particular intermediaries and their customers together. This personalistic background is not remarkable, and there are important parallels even in highly industrialized countries. But in the internal marketing systems of peasant societies, these small distinctions based on personal relationships loom more importantly. It needs emphasizing that, if this picture is wholly correct, it in no way contradicts the now common assertion that marketers in these societies have fully developed commercial motivations. In fact, the use of personalism in their transactions is economically sound and simply reflects awareness of the general social and economic characteristics of the societies in which they carry on their activities. The ninth point, then, would be: a price system based largely on the operation of supply and demand but backed up by a strong personalistic element which affects the nature of internal marketing activity.

These nine points provide a crude introduction to the viewing of internal marketing systems as systems. Something may be added here as to the way such systems serve as mechanisms of social articulation. The internal marketing system provides a focus of convergence of the interests of social and economic classes and their representatives. As such, it may afford a ladder of upward economic mobility for members of different groups. It can also serve as a device for the commercial exploitation of one class by another. The market system may serve to level classes, or to make class levels more distinct. Moreover, through the manipulation of the market structure, the state may be able to interfere in the class balance. In sum, internal market systems are more than mechanisms for exchange; they are as well part of the national institutional structure. Since this is so, changes within them or imposed upon them may have repercussions reaching far beyond their immediate economic effects. In the societies referred to earlier, the internal marketing systems are typified by relatively free movement of goods, services, and the people who deal in them. This freedom is symbolized by the sensitivity of prices to changes in the relationship of supply and demand, and by the relatively easy entry of new intermediaries filling new roles in the marketing chain whenever the chance of profit appears. Yet the internal markets are not the means for bulking and eventual exportation of world market staples, and only partly for the distribution of imports and manufactures essential to the daily life of the peasantry. Thus, two of the most important channels by which the articulation of different social and economic segments can be perceived have been largely set apart from the internal marketing system. This separation is partly a measure of the control wielded by the state power over the economic activity of the peasantry. Through control of licenses and permits, through decisions as to the number of intermediaries, and by other means, the state channels the movement of certain products outside the internal marketing system to serve its own ends and those of the classes which control it. This potentially conflictual articulation is revealed not by the operation of the internal marketing system itself, but by the marketing media set up outside that system.

At the same time, the internal markets continue to be the means by which the peasantry supplements its cash income from wage labor and from the production of staples for the world market. And to this extent the internal markets can and do reveal a different conflictual articulation of some importance. This may be clearer in the case of Haiti than in the other societies mentioned. Coffee, essential oil plants, sisal, and, formerly, cotton and bananas, constitute the major export crops; all but sisal are produced mainly by the peasantry. In terms of cultivated area or labor invested, however, probably none singly or even all together can compete with the food crops—millet, rice, maize, roots, legumes, etc.—which the peasantry produces for consumption and for sale in the local
markets. The sale of food for consumption within Haiti itself, then, constitutes a major alternative source of cash for the peasantry. No peasant commits his land and labor entirely to the production of coffee, or to the production of coffee and subsistence alone, and government programs to increase coffee production have never succeeded spectacularly. The peasantry continues to depend heavily upon its production of crops which may be sold locally and eaten. Accordingly, it may be correct to argue that the internal markets are the peasantry's first line of defense—after subsistence—against a deeper commitment to the production of world market staples. The way pressure may be applied to push up the production of world market staples may vary. Where such staples are produced on large-scale holdings, forced labor laws may be used, as they were for many years in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{19} Taxes of various sorts to compel small-scale subsistence cultivators to turn part of their productive effort toward export staples, or to force them into wage labor on estates, are also familiar. But in situations where the peasantry already produces world market staples on its own lands such measures are not always practicable. Instead, production may be increased by price supports, subsidies, lowered export taxes, and so on, so that the peasantry receives more for its effort and for the yield of its lands. Attempts may also be made to force up production by penalties of various kinds: taxation used as punishment for failure to produce export crops, differential land taxes, import tariffs which turn the terms of trade against the peasant, and so on. Whether the techniques used are encouragements in the form of a greater cash reward, or in the form of goads to production, is of course highly important; but in either case the connection between production for the world market and production for subsistence and the internal markets is a real and important one. The details of this relationship vary in many regards, and these need to be explored in the case of each peasant society studied. But the relationship itself highlights the role of the internal marketing system as a stage for the acting out of class interest.

For the peasant producer of world market staples, the effort he puts into production and the reward he receives for it sometimes seem to be connected in quixotic fashion; this is true particularly when the price of his product is subject to sharp and unexpected oscillation, and when government levies on the value of his product vary suddenly and significantly. The connection between effort and the reward he receives for the production of subsistence crops, and of those he may sell locally, must seem more reasonable—and in terms of market behavior perhaps it is. The role of government in affecting his success with export crops seems powerful; its role in affecting his success with crops for the internal markets is less striking. When the money yield to the peasant from world market crops is high, the price of food may rise, and vice versa—though this is by no means an invariable relationship. Where the relationship does hold, it may mean that the increased production of world market crops is accompanied by a decline in the production of food crops.\textsuperscript{20} And where this or its opposite does occur, world market crop production and food production are rivalrous with the economy. In such instances, the differences in objective between government and peasantry are to some extent exposed. The internal markets, which provide the peasantry with a modicum of cash especially when export crops yield little, may thus become a setting for a strange, half-concealed struggle affecting the entire social system of a peasant country. This struggle may be all the stranger by virtue of the cultural values, the stereotypes of peasant ignorance and inertia, and the faulty communication between the peasantry and representatives of other classes which it involves. Though this formulation is as yet largely hypothetical, there is nothing hypothetical in the assertion that the peasantry may neglect its world market
crops, even turning its lands more heavily to local food crops, when the reward for world market crops declines sharply. And a decline of this sort need not originate only in world market conditions; it could originate in the tax system of the country itself.

Only in recent years have the governments of peasant countries begun dimly to perceive that internal marketing systems are more than picturesque means for the peasant or his wife to while away idle hours. That such markets did provide an admirable setting for taxation, however, was long known. In Haiti today, for instance, the market woman is taxed for tethering her beast; for butchering a pig, sheep, goat or cow; for the stand on which pork is displayed for sale; for the grass roof beneath which wares are spread; and for the assessed values of the wares themselves; not to mention the license fees which are paid to permit dealing in certain products. Selling must not take place outside the market limits; resellers who buy within these limits are taxed for what they buy. Attempts have even been made by past governments to suppress many rural markets in order to concentrate activity in urban centers, and townsmen have circulated petitions for the crushing of rural markets. Though interventions of this sort, particularly in the form of taxation, affect market prices, they probably have not seriously affected the volume of internal trade. Whereas a sharp increase in taxation upon coffee production or a sharp drop in world market prices may affect such production in the subsequent year, it is much less likely that the taxes incident to local marketing operations affect the amount of internal market trade. On the basis of these assertions, it may be claimed further that the articulation of classes represented by the channels for the purchase and resale of world market crops is more rigid and more clearly defined than that afforded by the internal marketing system. The internal marketing system may, so to speak, allow for more "play" at present.

Only brief mention has been made so far of the intermediaries in internal marketing systems. Such middlemen stand between producer and consumer in the marketing chain, whether the exchange is proceeding horizontally or vertically. Hence they play a central role in the articulation of the peasantry with other classes, and of different segments of the peasantry with each other. Of course some trade proceeds without the intervention of middlemen. The wives of peasants who carry only a handful of produce to market in order to get cash to fill minor but immediate needs are numerically very important. Resident craftsmen, such as tinkers and sandal makers--and these are males--may sell their own handicrafts in the market places. And one small category of craftsmen, specializing in tourist items, sells its wares directly to elegant curio and "folk art" shops or directly to tourists, thus circumventing the internal marketing system entirely. (In its most rarefied form, this channel is represented by the artists and sculptors of Haiti and the silver workers of Mexico--but, in both cases, new varieties of mainly foreign intermediaries have found a profitable niche.)

But the bulk of peasant production moves through the internal markets and through the hands of intermediaries. Such intermediaries do not form a homogeneous group, any more than do the peasantry or the people of the cities. They vary from extremely poor middlemen, who sell small quantities of cooked food in the market places, to relatively wealthy rural and urban resellers and semiwholesalers, who bulk fairly substantial quantities of a few staple items, selling to internal market retailers in other centers. Since this variety of intermediaries does not form a homogeneous economic group, there is no reason to suppose that it is homogeneous socially or politically.

Of special importance in the present discussion are three categories of resellers. There are the city retailers, who reside in the capital or in provincial cities, maintain-
ing regular booths in the market places, buying their produce wholesale, and retailing it to local consumers of all classes. These retailers form a potent political group with interests divergent from those both of their customers and of those who sell to them. And there are the two categories of itinerant resellers, who may reside in the city or in the countryside, dealing in wholesale stock, buying in the country to sell in the city, or the opposite, or doing both. These resellers form what are perhaps the most significant categories of intermediary, insofar as the market as a mechanism of social articulation is concerned. In the scale of their operations, and in the amount of capital they possess, such intermediaries may be as substantial as small storekeepers, and in some cases may even exceed them. But their social position is almost certain to be below that of the *petit bourgeois*. Since many of these intermediaries live in rural areas, come from peasant families, or have persisting roots in the country, their interests may be connected to some extent with the peasantry. Yet the nature of their operations may just as well contrapose them against the countryside. That is, they may be peasants in culture while their economic operations align them with the urban bourgeoisie. Though these intermediaries have not emerged so dramatically within the internal marketing systems of the New World as have the "market mammys" of Ghana, the potentiality for this emergence may be present.

Lack of space compels the omission of several other points which could be explored in preliminary fashion. Major emphasis has been restricted here to a description of internal market systems as mechanisms, with but secondary attention to the way such mechanisms can express integration or conflict among various economic and social groupings within the society at large. To the extent that economic behavior in the market place is free of restrictions, the market system may serve to galvanize or consolidate new economic groupings and to permit the vested economic interests of different groups to play themselves out. Our lack of sufficient detailed information on the functioning of internal market systems precludes any satisfactory comparative analysis now. Perhaps at least some of the sorts of information that are needed will have been suggested in the present paper.

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6. The writer has had one instance of barter brought to his attention in Jamaica. There is some barter, even in market places, still occurring in Guatemala. According to Pro-
fessor John Murra (personal communication), there are Andean markets operating today still characterized almost exclusively by barter.

7. This was first noted in print in the case of Haiti by M. Edouard Berrouet, See Métraux et al., 1951, pp. 2-3.

8. The term "withholding power," devised by Lauriston Sharp to describe the Thai peasant's capacity to store produce rather than being forced to sell off in order to acquire liquid capital or other goods, is very apt. See Sharp, Hauck, et al., 1953.

9. This of course not to say that such limitations are unreasonable or unnecessary. Each such restriction has to be judged according to its merits. In all cases, however, these restrictions do shape the course of economic activity in particular ways.

10. Professor Gates has pointed out to the writer that the intermediaries who handle export commodities such as cotton and coffee in Haiti are usually numerous, locate their buying centers in the same villages, and are faced by crowds of peasant sellers, such that the mode of transaction is analogous to what occurs in the market places. In spite of this, the social character of specialized intermediaries and the role of government in licensing their activities set this aspect of marketing distinctly apart from the internal marketing system.


12. In this connection, see for instance Myint, 1958, pp. 328-29.

13. Personal correspondence.


18. This argument is easily overstated, however. In the case of Haiti, there seem to be hardly any restrictions on the sale of licenses for specialized intermediaries. Such intermediaries exercise not the slightest monopolistic control, and in fact compete for sellers, so far as could be determined.

19. See for instance Jones, 1940.

20. Myint, in the work cited, points out that, where surplus productive capacity is present in peasant societies, the production of cash export crops may be undertaken without any diminution in the production of subsistence. However, if a peasant society is producing at nearly top capacity and its production for export is increased without any improvement in technique, it is obvious that production for subsistence will barely remain constant and may even decline. Contrariwise, Myint indicates that in areas of heavy population concentration, such as Indonesia (especially Java and Madura) and Fiji, subsistence production has actually been expanding at the cost of plantation agriculture. He does not find this occurring in the West Indies, but, in matter of fact, Haiti may well be a case in point.


22. Ibid., p. 133.

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